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 “We will not argue the opportunity of the conservation or the abandon of Algeria, the answer will be apparent in our 
analysis.” (Juglar, 1853, Journal des Economistes, T.36, n°148, p.215). 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
The objective of this paper is to recall the forgotten opposition of Clément Juglar to the colonization 
of Algeria, the originality of this position, and his contributions to the genesis of analyzing colonial 
institutions. Juglar was not a theoretician of colonialism, but a liberal economist, who rejected the 
process of colonization on economic grounds. This paper provides evidence that conventional 
wisdom on French colonialism is indebted to his work. The issues of return of investment in the 
colonies, French colonialism as mercantilism and protectionism, and the role of colonial institutions 
in economic development, are all addressed by Juglar. He identifies property rights and colonial 
institutions as central issues in his explanation for the predictable failure of colonialism, and in doing 
so can be regarded as a forerunner of the neo-institutionalist analysis of colonialism. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is a rehabilitation of the work of French economist and statistician Clément Juglar. It aims 
to demonstrate how economic arguments presented by Juglar (1853), condemning France’s 
colonization of Algeria, reappeared in more recent literature a century and a half later. The paper 
highlights Juglar’s unique contribution to modern economic thought regarding French colonization, 
by identifying his criticism of colonialism, views which can be detected in more recent work by 
Marseille (1984) and Fitzgerald (1988). Our focus on Juglar’s analytical contribution, examines the 
influence of his writings on today’s anticolonial views, by deliberately combining history of 
economic thought with more recent literature. We believe the current debate underestimates Juglar’s 
views on colonization or proposes a historiographical approach similar to that found in Frobert and 
Hamouda (2008), Frobert (2009), Dal-Pont and Frobert (2009 and 2010). It seems Juglar’s analysis 
on the return of capital in the colonies, and the importance of clear and secure property rights, have 
been forgotten or ignored. Our paper seeks to remedy this. 
 
Characterizing Juglar’s economic thoughts on colonialism among his liberal contemporaries is not 
the purpose of our analysis. This topic is already well documented in the literature by Clément (2013) 
who claims the rejection of the old colonial pact by anti-colonial liberal authors did not extend to a 
complete denunciation of colonization in all its forms. Blanqui (1840), Molinari (1853), Duval (1857) 
and Leroy-Beaulieu (1874) all question whether colonialism was compatible with liberalism and free-
trade1. Beyond the unanimous rejection of traditional colonialism by liberal economists before 1860, 
there came the emergence of “new motives and conditions for colonization under the Second Empire”, 
                                                 
     1 Blanqui (1840: 71) claims “Settlement of the colonies is necessary in order for colonization to have positive effects, 
but the only acceptable undertaking is voluntary and based on purely individual interests – colonies must be free and 
voluntary”. Molinari (1853: 401) explained the success of colonization of California as follows: “the settlers were led 
there solely by the lure of profits greater than those attainable through other investments”. Duval (1857: 371) argues: “If 
colonies of Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and Northern origin are more prosperous than those of neo-Latin, Catholic and 
Southern origin, one of the main reasons for this is the free development of individual initiative in the former, whereas 
official initiative is imposed upon and contains the latter”. 
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and a barrier increasingly blurred between Saint-Simonians2 and liberals (Clément (2013: 59). This 
view, shared by Palmade (1962) and Le Van-Lemesle (2004) stresses that Saint-Simonian ideas had 
won over the liberal side.  
 
General agreement in the literature regarding the evolution of liberal discourse, in favour of 
colonization, further highlights the originality of Juglar’s work. The author departs from his liberal 
contemporaries on this point. He remained a fierce opponent of colonialism, based strictly on liberal 
economic arguments, and opposed the Saint-Simonian conception of French colonization (Zouache, 
2009). State intervention, he believed, could only serve to disrupt and distort the choices of 
individuals. Obvious evidence of Juglar’s (1853: 215) anti-colonialist views can be summed up by 
his assertion that “We will not argue the opportunity of the conservation or the abandonment of 
Algeria, the answer will be apparent in our analysis”. In this respect, it seems that Juglar differed 
quite markedly from his French counterparts.  
 
Clément (2013) contends that the debate in France regarding colonization was not as rich as that 
occurring in Britain at the same time. He argues authors such as Torrens and Wakefield raised issues 
concerning investment opportunities in the colonies and greater capital returns, matters that were 
receiving little attention in France. We refute this view and provide evidence to the contrary. The 
issues addressed by Torrens and Wakefield constituted one of the cornerstones of Juglar’s analysis 
of the failure of French colonialism. Juglar (1853) applies the principles of economic liberalism to 
demonstrate the futility of colonization and its impending failure. His ex-ante analysis of colonization 
in Algeria, is now confirmed by ex-post analysis by contemporary economists. Juglar’s assessment 
has had remarkable longevity, but in spite of this, a paradox exists. Economic contributions to the 
                                                 
     2 Saint-Simonianism was a French political and social movement of the first half of the 19th century, inspired by the 
ideas of Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon. 
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Algerian colonial debate seldom appear in French economic history. Only Marseille (1984) and 
Fitzgerald (1988) have addressed the issue in recent times.  
 
Marseille (1984) considers whether French investors had benefited from colonial investment. He 
contends that the colonial empire was the French capital’s “crutch”, with the colonial market acting 
as a protected zone for declining French industries, justified in the name of the “autarchic system”. 
Juglar (1853) had reached the same conclusion by mobilizing the theory of producer surplus, 
developed by Augustin Cournot. The issue of capital invested by France in Algeria is still unresolved 
today (Marseille (1984) versus Aron, (1962)).  Juglar (1853) lays the premise of this debate in pre-
modern terms, foreshadowing the Lucas paradox, by condemning the shortage of innovative 
entrepreneur figures in Algeria. Fitzgerald (1988) questions whether France's colonial position made 
economic sense using French balance of payments data. The author concludes that the economic 
utility of the empire to France was in fact more spurious than real. This position was again first 
highlighted by Juglar (1853). Additionally, the modern school of Law and Finance addresses the 
impact of institutions on economic performance in former colonies, and the influence of colonial 
institutions on economic development. Juglar (1853) had identified the importance of clearly defined 
property rights in such development, the absence of which resulted in the failure of any settlement. 
This unknown contribution of Juglar (1853) to the institutionalist analysis deserves to be restored.  
 
Since the primary objective of this article is to promote the forgotten works of Juglar, and highlight 
the originality of these, this paper cites Juglar’s texts directly. Since the texts speak largely for 
themselves, our commentary will be voluntarily limited to leave place for the depth of the analysis of 
the author himself. This paper continues as follows. Section 2 examines the value of colonial 
investment in Algeria. Section 3 considers why conventional wisdom on French colonialism, such as 
mercantilism and protectionism, are indebted to Juglar’s analysis. Section 4 examines the role of 
colonial institutions in Juglar’s economic thought. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. French colonial investment in Algeria: Marseille, Juglar and the Lucas Paradox 
When considering the reasons for colonization, one question that quickly emerges is what was the 
rate of return from colonial investment? Marseille (1984) addresses this issue by considering major 
sectors French capital flows were invested into, and notes some very high “rates of profit”, frequently 
reaching 30% and even occasionally 50% for colonial firms, in the Algerian mining sector. This rate 
of profit is calculated from the return on French colonial firms out of a ratio defined as “rate of profit,” 
used by Bouvier, et al. (1965). Marseille (1984: 148) explains this calculation by stating:  
“to take into account the dramatic movements in prices at that time, …we have constructed a 
series of capital in constant francs …corrected for inflation. Then we have calculated for each 
year the ratio of the distributed dividends …to identify a financial profitability that compares 
the distributed dividends to the ‘fresh’ money brought by shareholders”.   
Using this approach Marseille (1984) concludes that mining and industrial firms realized the highest 
profit rates, while trade, plantation and transport firms realized the lowest. This however does not tell 
the full story. Marseille’s arguments are too often based on a few examples of extreme rates of return, 
at punctual dates. The author does not compare his results with a reference sample by including firms 
operating in metropolitan or foreign territories. Such outliers can be misleading. Instead, tests on a 
large sample of colonial firms should be considered. Evidently, it seems that Marseille (1984) wanted 
to provide evidence of the prominence of the mining sector in French colonial investment. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, Marseille’s argument suffers some limitations. Failure to take 
account of both the development of modern portfolio theory and risk-return analysis are problematic 
(see: Edlinger, Merli and Parent, 2013; Edelstein, 1982). The author never considers the risk carried 
by investors, a component of key investment performance. The relationship between return and risk 
had been considered by French investors as early as the end of the 19th century (see Edlinger and 
Parent, 2014). Marseille’s explanation regarding the rate of profit does not allow for the assessment 
of whether colonial assets were riskier than French or other foreign assets, and whether they exhibited 
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higher returns. Ultimately, Marseille (1984) ignores the optimal portfolio strategy consisting of 
limiting the specific risk of each asset by diversification. Since the issue of the comparative 
performance between metropolitan, colonial and foreign firms ought to be carried out within a 
portfolio framework, the conclusions reached need to be taken with the most extreme caution.  
 
Marseille’s (1984) findings are challenged by Parent and Rault (2004) who, using data from Feis 
(1930) and Cameron (1961), estimate that French colonial assets represented only 5% of all French 
foreign assets in 1892 and just 8% by 1913. Despite a slight increase, these figures do not corroborate 
Marseille’s analysis according to which, from the beginning of the 20th century, and especially over 
the interwar period, the French colonial empire was a “privileged outlet for capital exports”. The key 
question is, if French investors expected higher returns on colonial investments, why did they invest 
so little in this part of the world?  Aron (1962) questions why France would conquer large swathes of 
Africa, yet did not invest capital surpluses in these countries? This question was answered more than 
one hundred and sixty years early by Juglar (1853) who provided an explanation for the lack of 
investment in colonial Algeria, citing poorly targeted legislation that penalizes capital and, 
consequently, economic growth.  
 
In essence Juglar (1853) had provided an “anticipated” answer to the Lucas Paradox formulated in 
19903. According to Lucas (1990), the neoclassical standard prediction of capital flows appears 
incorrect. Lucas posed several potential reasons for this paradox including external benefits of human 
capital, capital market imperfections, and political risk. Juglar (1853) had reached a similar 
conclusion and addressed the issue of a lack of capital investment in Algeria, citing an inefficient 
French tax system and poor regulation as the cause. Juglar (1853) suggests that French government 
                                                 
     3 The law of diminishing returns studied by Lucas (1990: 92) implies that “the marginal product of capital is higher in 
the less productive (in the poorer) economy. If so, then, if trade in capital good is free and competitive, new investments 
will occur only in the poorer economy, and this will continue to be true until capital/labor ratios, and hence, wages and 
capital returns are equalized”.  He continues: “If this model were anywhere close to being accurate and world capital 
markets were anywhere close to being free and complete, it is clear that, in the face of return differentials of this 
magnitude, investment goods would flow rapidly from wealthy countries to poor countries” (Lucas, 1990: 92).  
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attempts to reform property rights were counterproductive, made it impossible to set up large 
agricultural and industrial properties, penalized investment, and discouraged the development of 
entrepreneurs in Algeria, preventing the country’s economic development. Juglar claims (1853: 225-
226): 
“[…] By obliging buyers to establish a European family and to construct a house for every 20 
hectares, the ordinance of 21 July 1846 settled the greatest question of colonization, to wit, 
what type of exploitation was best for Algeria: large, middle or small. By deciding a priori 
that it was the middle-sized property, and by obliging all potential purchasers to accept this, 
the government prevented all those who possessed large funds from trying their luck in 
Algeria. […] When they decided on smaller landholders, they did not realize that they were 
those who were the least likely to come, the most fearful, lacking knowledge, the least open to 
innovation, careful enough to avoid dubious business, where the potential profit was always 
minimal relative to the risk. For them, there was only ruin or a slight improvement to their 
lot.”  
 
Juglar (1853: 226) continues by developing an argument in which risk aversion diminishes relative 
to the level of personal wealth, and explains the failure of colonization in a way that predates the 
economic analysis of risk. He says: 
“…large capital, exposed to the same unfavourable chances, has greater resources to survive 
the first failure. What drives these [large] investors is the hope of a much larger reward, gain, 
or profit…the [small] investor could be wiped out [and] in the most favourable circumstances, 
can only expect to increase his capital by at most a quarter or a half, the [large investor] can 
double it. It is this latter hope that allows the large investor to close his eyes to the expected 
loss; the fear of ruin does not stop him, because a potentially brilliant reward awaits him, a 
reward that the small cultivator cannot expect to achieve. […] This middling class of 
cultivators, that we must encourage in France because they are an honest and moral 
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population, for which the traditions of family life are best perpetuated, has no adventurous 
spirit, the raw desire for profit that drives you to furthest regions with the hope of easy fortune 
[…] By attempting to summon this class of cultivators, we might just as well have predicted 
that they would not respond; for, in addition to the trip, the emigration, the abandon of their 
native land, which they would have to accept, they would not want to risk the capital that they 
have painstakingly amassed.”  
He continued: 
“There was another class that could have been attracted to Africa, the capitalists. The 
Ordinance of 21 July 1846 put an end to the very desirable development of industrial activity 
by imposing impossible constraints on whoever wanted to set up a large estate. By rejecting 
their support, the French deprived themselves of the greatest and the most indispensable 
means of colonization…They thought that they had taken care of a great evil by expelling the 
large capitalists and the speculators who always accompanied them. They waited a long time, 
and they are still waiting for the middle class of cultivators. So they decided to resort to the 
last category of immigrants, those whose only capital is the force in their arms.” (1853: 227-
228) 
 
When Juglar (1853: 232) turns to the analysis of the capital factor, he extends his arguments relating 
to incentive mechanisms in an even more convincing and contemporary manner: 
“Let us now turn to why the capital, which is the second condition of all settlement, fails to 
flow. The motives are of the same nature: capital is fearful, less adventurous than men, 
especially when potential profits are limited. […] They seek everywhere the most considerable 
return, the use that will provide the greatest interest. It abandons agriculture for industry 
where profits are higher and quicker, and artificially increased by our prohibitive and 
protectionist system of tariffs. […] It is therefore into the only industry possible in Algeria, 
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the construction, purchase and sale of houses, that speculation and capital flows. Agriculture, 
which requires great outlay that is only recuperated in the long-term, has been neglected.”  
 
Juglar’s line of reasoning is in every way an exemplary of a precursor to modern economic thought.  
The question of capital occupies a central part in the economic analysis of French colonization given 
that it is a clue to the underlying motives of colonization. The debate regarding the motivations of 
French colonization continues to this day. Marseille (1984) provides partial evidence of very high 
yields, gleaned from colonial registers in Algeria, which could lead one to believe Algeria was a 
profitable destination for investment. Conversely, Aron (1962) questions how one could consider the 
colonization of Algeria profitable when no capital was invested there? Juglar had already launched 
this debate in 1853. If French investors expected high yields, why did so few invest? Juglar (1853: 
233) argues in order to attract investment it would have been necessary to set up a sufficiently 
attractive system of incentives: 
“The expectation of great profits alone would have been able to attract large investments, and 
we have seen the infuriating precautions that were taken to keep them out. It is even very likely 
that, without speculation, they would not have come with a serious purpose […] Farming 
implies the immobilization of capital in the exploitation of the land. The return for this outlay 
made for the land return is slow. […] Just the idea of setting up shop abroad, without hope of 
a return and with the few advantages that agriculture presents, was the main obstacle to the 
Algerian settlement.”  
By identifying that capital transfers from metropolitan France to colonial Algeria failed, and 
providing an explanation why erroneous tax legislation resulted in drastically low levels of private 
investment, Juglar can be considered as one of the first economists to formulate the Lucas paradox.  
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Section 3. French colonialism as protectionism and mercantilism: What has changed since 
Juglar’s seminal analysis? 
According to Marseille (1984) and Fitzgerald (1988) the dominant view on French colonialism was 
that it resulted in both protectionism and mercantilism. In this section we recall the cornerstones of 
this conventional wisdom and illustrate that its origins can be traced back to Juglar (1853). Marseille 
(1984) pinpoints two factors that made the Great Depression a crucial period for the French colonial 
strategy: economic motives and political debates. This period supposedly illustrates the essence of 
colonialism, and the protectionism that followed. Marseille (1984: 230) argues that the crisis starting 
in 1929 was a “great overproduction crisis”. The French empire was to act as a form of replacement 
market for activities harmed by the Great Depression. This reasoning is supported by Marseille’s 
(1984: 59) assertion that over the interwar period, “the colonial empire became a crucial commercial 
partner” and “the crisis that harmed French exports in the rest of the world did not affect the colonial 
outlet that fully played its role of shock absorber.” (1984: 63). Marseille (1984: 75-77) gives multiple 
examples of the usefulness of the protected colonial market for French industries, and cites markets 
for cotton, sugar, iron and steel industries as being particularly important. He continues by saying:  
“The empire was an essential reservoir for agriculture. Sectors like wool, silk turned at that 
time to the colonial market. Car and chemical industries sold in the second half of colonial 
history at least a third of their total exports …During the interwar period, the empire became 
the first commercial partner of France; it furnished France with the totality of its imported 
agricultural goods; it absorbed the main part of cotton, soap, sugar French exports. It enabled 
the French car steel and iron industries to maintain their export capacities”. 
The interwar period also reveals political conflicts concerning the development of French colonies. 
In the face of contracting markets at home and abroad in the wake of the Great Depression, the 
“colonial outlet” became important to various sectors of French capitalism seeking an alternative 
destination in which to exports goods and services (Marseille 1984).  
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At the opening of the Metropolitan France economic conference on the 3rd December of 1934, Albert 
Sarraut described what he called stratégie ‘autarchique’ or protectionism, which enabled the 
metropolitan area of France to export goods and services and absorb colonial production in order to 
enable the French Empire to outperform its international rivals. The cotton industry was selected as 
the leading sector in this strategy of protectionism, with the automobile industry acting as an auxiliary. 
According to Marseille, the ‘autarchique’ strategy existed within the context of two conflicting 
beliefs. The first, the dawning era of liberalism and reductions in customs dues and tariffs, and the 
second, the need to industrialize the empire and protect fledgling colonial markets so they could 
develop and prosper. Ultimately, Marseille (1984) concluded that the protectionism displayed during 
the interwar period was nothing but the Maginot Line of traditional French industries unwilling to 
change, and frightened by the scale of restructuring required.   
 
Fitzgerald (1988) adopted a different approach and argues that the French colonial empire was a 
considerable political construction along with spurious economic benefits. The empire seemed to be 
something other than a simple political asset, and by the 1930s, the colonies had become France’s 
principal trading partner. The captive nature of colonial markets, allowed the least competitive French 
exporters (small scale, high costs export firms) to maintain profit levels. Symmetrically, French 
consumers paid higher than world prices for colonial imports. However, France continued to run trade 
surpluses with the colonies from the 1930s until the decolonization period. According to Fitzgerald 
(1988), the outflow of metropolitan capital offset the colonies’ payment deficits with France and 
made the continued imbalance in trade possible. Fitzgerald calls this “mercantilist regulation”. As the 
colonies had a constantly negative trade balance with the rest of the world, the French economy had 
to subsides the colonies in order to maintain them. Fitzgerald (1988) concluded that the benefit of the 
colonial markets to French exporters was more than offset by the subsidization required in order to 
maintain the empire. Ultimately, he considered the French colonial empire a financial burden that 
France could no longer afford by the 1960s. Juglar (1853) reaches an identical conclusion 135 years 
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earlier. Fitzgerald therefore argues French colonialism must have been politically driven as it was 
clearly economically inefficient based on available balance of payment data. This ex post explanation 
for the failure of French colonialism had been delivered ex ante by Juglar, when he forecast the failure 
of Algeria’s colonization. Juglar’s (1853: 222) sums up the predictable failure of colonization of 
Algeria by suggesting: 
“…for a nation to pay cash, it must first possess some. Yet, since 1830, Algeria has only the 
money that we have sent there… We must therefore admit that, since 1830, it is the French 
money that we have sent there with one hand that comes back to us in the other. France thus 
pays directly for the exports made to Africa. France is the one who sells and who pays, 
fulfilling this double role. However, whereas everyone in France contributes to the expense, 
only a small number of Europeans set up in Africa take part in the profits. The difference 
between imports and exports is paid for with funds taken from the State budget, to maintain 
our colony. If this is what one calls a favourable and prosperous position, we have only to set 
up more like it all over.”  
This quotation reaches an ironic conclusion and produces not only one of the first analyses of 
colonialism in terms of rent seeking, but also that of the balance of payments between Algeria and 
France. Rent seeking was possible due to perverse incentives which according to Juglar (1853: 223) 
resulted in the accrual of the majority of benefits to a minority, with the system of existing incentives 
“ill conceived, and contrary to our own interests… to protect our trade, [and] increase our exports, 
[these incentives] always starting by taxing the revenue of the nation, [and] skimming off the capital 
necessary to make these improvements”. Distortions in consumption and production were brought 
about by the subsidies in place. The simplicity with which he transposes the theory of producer and 
consumer surplus, outlined by his contemporary Antoine Cournot, is striking.  
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Section 4: Colonial institutions and property rights in Juglar’s economic thought 
Juglar (1853) explains the failure of French colonialism in Algeria through the lens of institutional 
economics. In assessing Algeria, Juglar (1853) is confronted with the difficult problem of explaining 
institutional change, a question that has characterized the research agenda of Nobel Laureate Douglas 
North for decades (Hodgson, 2017). Three institutional explanations are forwarded for the ultimate 
failure of French Colonialism; the first insufficient property rights; the second inappropriate 
regulation and the instability of colonial institutions; and the third, an absence of incentives and 
distortive subsidies.  Some of the ideas expressed by Juglar (1853) enable us to establish a clear 
theoretical link between his work and that of the neo-institutionalist school of thought.  
 
Insufficient property rights  
Juglar (1853) provides a picture of the French colonization and dismisses the Saint-Simonian spirit. 
He highlights the importance of individual control and private ownership, rejects the role of the state, 
and describes what he considers to be one of the causes of the failure of colonization in Algeria: a 
project based on the economically inefficient, Saint-Simonian “collective culture”. Juglar (1853: 68) 
argues that: 
“The government takes care of founding agricultural centres; since 1843, this type of 
colonization has dominated…[and] was no longer simply a protector, but a creator, the 
supporter of these new colonies. It was the State which, at great expense, put all the money 
up front, distributed the land, built the houses with the help of the army, for it is thanks to the 
engineering regiments that we owe most of the buildings in villages. The land was cleared and 
plantations executed by troops. The State supplied the necessary capital for these expenses. It 
was the State who delivered the instruments, the seed, the animals, etc. in other words, all the 
expenses necessary for an agricultural estate. Once everything was ready, they installed the 
population in the new village, both civil and military settlers. Then the troubles began”.  
He continues: 
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“…to seriously farm the land, the settlers were still lacking many things. Most often, not being 
able to invest in grains, they limited themselves to growing vegetables, which would never be 
enough to live on and could not help them improve their lot. To this weakness was added 
illness and fever which wiped out these poor populations. The unfavourable atmospheric 
conditions, a great drought or a flood, clouds of locus, came to wipe out the fruits of their 
long hard labour, and it did not take long for despair and disgust to fill the hearts of even the 
most courageous. The debris of the colony moved to the nearest town, preferably Algiers.” 
(Juglar, 1853: 68)  
 
In true pre-Coasean style, Juglar (1853) describes property rights as the foundation of all economic 
activity. He develops a premonitory theory, exemplifying that the failure of colonization is due to the 
absence of clearly defined property rights, composing passages that Coase and North would not have 
rejected more than a century later. He emphasizes the role of property rights, making it the heart of 
his explanation for the inevitable failure of colonization, and argues that the absence of clearly 
established property rights is the first cause of economic stagnation. Throughout his reflection on 
property rights, Juglar reveals himself as a liberal economist who is critical of colonization. His 
modern and premonitory analysis is striking. In essence, colonialism due to its very nature, lacks a 
clearly established conception of property rights and inevitably leads to failure. Juglar (1853: 101) 
argues this point by saying: 
“People do not realize enough how great is the influence of the form of property and the 
guaranties that it creates in a country on the social constitution, the development of culture 
and industry. […] From its stability or its instability derives a host of consequences to which 
people generally do not pay enough attention.”  
This he believes, gave rise to cultural and incentives problems as: 
“Europeans ignored the customs of the country, hungry for land, gave themselves up to 
outrageous speculations, seeking property deeds, with the sole hope of reselling them for 
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profit, without worrying at all about taking care of the properties themselves. Most often, the 
indigenous population sold only the right to use the land…while the Europeans believed to 
have obtained full property rights…As the French occupation was not regarded as serious, 
the former masters and owners of the land quickly sold everything they possessed, some to re-
establish their business and their fortune, others to get rid of onerous property; but all 
believed that they would get their land back once the French army left. This situation caused 
an unprecedented spate of speculation which created a great number of difficulties for the 
French government.” (1853: 107). 
 
It is tempting after reading this passage to draw a parallel with North and neo-institutionalism. North 
and Thomas (1973: 1) recall in medieval Europe  
“efficient organization entails the establishment of institutional arrangements and property 
rights that create an incentive to channel individual economic effort into activities that bring 
the private rate of return close to the social rate of return”. 
Hodgson (2017) suggests failure to protect property rights “opened the door to an understanding of 
the possible endurance of inefficient institutions”. The aforementioned is important. Juglar considers 
the institutional origin of property rights in Algeria, namely the misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the distinction between Habou and Melk goods (a confusion between, 
respectively, the right to use the land and the full property rights) by the French administration and 
settlers. This he believed, was the primary cause of the inefficiency of the French-Algerian colonial 
institution.  
 
Inappropriate regulation and the instability of colonial institutions  
Having exposed how poorly adapted property rights can be the source of economic inefficiency, 
Juglar continues by demonstrating how incessant changes to regulation both punished current 
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investment and discouraged future investment, creating an uncertain horizon for the settlers. Juglar 
(1853: 229-230) states that: 
“In the midst of all these vicissitudes Algeria experienced until 1846, the administration 
decided to deliver the final blow to put an end to this instability […]. By the ordinance of 21 
July 18464 […], it imposed on all rural properties a verification process to check their origin 
and the legitimacy of possession. [After] setting property rights on this stable foundation […], 
the ordinance of 1 July 1847 did have conversely a direct and negative impact on colonization. 
It reinstated the perpetual rent. […] The most fatal clause is the one that required a deposit 
of 10 francs per hectare for every sale above 100 hectares always afraid that people abused 
large sales and only sought them for speculative purposes. […] Why must we observe and 
recognize so late and so myopically the pernicious effects of all these complicated 
regulations?” (Juglar, 1853: 230-231). 
This demonstrates Juglar belief that under the French colonial regime, entrepreneurship in Algeria 
was discouraged due to inappropriate tax legislation, which prevented market forces from interacting, 
a point echoed by North (1990). Juglar evokes North’s (1981) assumption, according to which, only 
market forces can underwrite economic efficiency and rule out inefficient institutions. Juglar 
characterizes the French colonial system in Algeria as a system that favoured constant changes in tax 
legislation, inducing uncertainty for settlers, and consequently penalized investment. 
 
Lack of incentives and distorting subsidies 
It is possible to observe in Juglar (1853) a modern line of reasoning that foreshadows the economics 
of incentives. Juglar (1853: 84), recalling the utility of subsidies, claims:  
                                                 
     4 This ordinance “outlined the numerous obligations of buyers. For every 20 hectares of land sold, the seller had to 
construct a house of a value of 5000 francs, to establish within a year a European family, and finally to plant 30 trees 
per hectare within 5 years. As long as these conditions were not met, property could not be sold or mortgaged without 
the authorization of the governor general. It is by these means that the government wanted to model the agiotage, and 
believed that it had; but at the same time it drove away speculators and serious buyers.” (Juglar, 1853: 107-108) 
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“What the farmers had always been lacking up to this point, in Algeria as well as in France, 
was the capital necessary to develop and improve crops. Each time that these will expect to 
be able to sell certain products and to receive cash in exchange, one can be sure that all their 
efforts will take this direction.”  
He continues by criticizing the distortions created by an inappropriate system of subsidies and (1853: 
228-229) describes the Algerian colony as an economy of subsidies, insisting the distortive effects 
created by these subsidies were in the name of military presence and ecclesiastical dominance: 
“The administration itself built the villages and cleared the land using troops, granted 
subsidies for the free passage on State boats, supplied food, farming tools, seed, animals, and 
thus managed to maintain in a very precarious manner agricultural centres. […] The 
Trappists of Staouëli and the establishment of father Brumaud in Ben Acknoun must be 
highlighted. Both these establishments only survive thanks to State subsidies in the form of 
cash, kind and men. […] The State placed at their disposal military convicts who executed 
most of the work. […] The establishment of father Brumaud is merely a warehouse for orphans 
and young children that have been designated for agriculture. Owner and director of the 
house, he receives according to the agreement he struck in 1845, for each child, an initial sum 
of 60 francs, then 21 ½ francs per month, until the age of 15…The little development of free 
colonization since the conquest, and especially since 1845, is demonstrated by the 
embarrassment with which the administration speaks of it. […] All agricultural centres that 
one observes today were created and are maintained by the administration.”. 
The conclusion describes an inefficient and unproductive colonial settlement, guided by an 
administrative concept that ignores economic efficiency. Above all, the colony was a military and 
administrative exercise, with Juglar (1853: 223) expressing the ironic view that “France is rich enough 
to pay for its glory”5.  
                                                 
     5 It is worth noting Fitzgerald (1988) reached almost the same word for word conclusion but lacked the irony 
displayed by Juglar (1853). 
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His description of colonial Algeria is very similar to the “limited access order” described by North, 
Wallis and Weingast (2009). Indeed, his assessment of the colony in terms of rent seeking by a 
minority of “colons” exporters, fits this definition well. Hodgson (2017) emphasizes that in North’s 
thought “a key analytical problem was to explain the transition from ‘limited access’ to ‘open access’ 
orders”. It is clear that for Juglar (1853) liberalism is a way to reach it. In this debate, Juglar would 
have defended the view that market forces are a way to overpass faulty colonial institutions. 
Ultimately, to complete the analysis of the correspondences between neo-institutionalist thought and 
Juglar, it is beneficial to question the idea of North (1990) that institutional change is often path 
dependent. In this view, as formulated by Hodgson (2017), “institutions could remain stuck in 
relatively inefficient developmental paths”. In North’s (1994) terms, “most societies throughout 
history got ‘stuck’ in an institutional matrix that did not evolve”. Juglar provided this analysis just 20 
years after the beginning of the colonization in Algeria and three core reasons why Algeria would 
remain stuck in a colonial matrix that could not evolve.  
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5. Conclusion 
This article rehabilitates Juglar’s thought on colonialism and identifies him as an early pioneer of the 
analysis of colonial institutions. This is required as currently there is an underestimation of the 
Juglar’s contributions to the colonial debate. His identification of the importance of property rights 
pre-dates the current neo-institutionalist interpretation, and for this reason, he can be considered a 
precursor of the neo-institutionalist conception of the colonial question. Colonization in his view, was 
essentially a form of military occupation, where imports are proportionate to the number of soldiers, 
and the economy is characterized by protectionist policies and an absence of a domestic market. Juglar 
reaches this conclusion based on an absence of clearly defined property rights and defective 
institutions. For this reason, he can rightly be regarded as one of the founding fathers of the property 
rights analysis and therefore, one of the unacknowledged ancestors of Coase, North and the neo-
institutionalist tradition of colonial studies.  
 
In light of our analysis, conventional wisdom on colonial Algeria as protectionism and mercantilism 
seems also largely indebted to Juglar’s “premonitory” analysis. All the rhetorical arguments of liberal 
economic thought are found in Juglar’s work and applied to colonialism: disutility, detrimental side-
effects, and endangerment. The noteworthy traveller records in his journals one of the very first liberal 
economic criticism of colonialism. Moreover, he delivers an explanation for the Lucas paradox, one 
and a half centuries prior to its formulation. The most striking element of his economic analysis 
regarding the failure of colonialism is that his “chronicle of approaching death” of colonialism is 
based on seemingly timeless arguments that make Juglar one of the precursors of the economic 
analysis of colonial institutions. 
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